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SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION - LOST IN
CAUSATION: INVESTORS NOT ENTITLED TO
PRESUMPTION OF LOSS CAUSATION IN FRAUD-ONTHE-MARKET CASES -DURA PHARMACEUTICALS,
INC. v. BROUDO, 125 S.CT. 1627 (2005)
To protect investors, the federal securities laws provide for a private
cause of action when a company has engaged in fraud.' In particular, investors can recover where the company has made any "untrue statement of
material fact" or has omitted any material fact "necessary in order to make
the statements made... not misleading.",2 To be successful in such an action, investors must prove, among other elements, that the defendant's4
3
fraud caused their economic loss. In Dura Pharmaceuticalsv. Broudo,
the United States Supreme Court considered whether investors are entitled
to a presumption of loss causation, requiring only that they establish that
the price of the security on the date of purchase was inflated because of the
misrepresentation. 5 In rejecting such a presumption, the Court held that
investors must specifically prove that the defendant's misrepresentation
caused the loss for which they seek to recover.6 Investors must now allege
and prove not that the misrepresentation caused inflation of the security's
price, but rather that the misrepresentation caused a subsequent decline in
its price.
1 See infra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing section 10(b) of Securities
and Exchange Act and Rule 10(b)-5 promulgated thereunder).
2 See infra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing private cause of action for
securities fraud).
3 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2005) (outlining statutory requirements for pleading
securities fraud in private causes of action).
4 125 S. Ct. 1627 (2005).
5 125 S. Ct. at 1629 (quoting Broudo v. Dura Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 938 (9th
Cir. 2003), rev'd, 125 S. Ct. 1627 (2005)) (noting that Ninth Circuit adopted the "on the
date of purchase" position).
6 See 125 S. Ct. at 1633 (explaining that relevant statute expressly imposes burden
on investors). Investors have "'the burden of proving' that the defendant's misrepresentations 'caused the loss for which they seek to recover."' Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(b)(4)).
7 See 125 S. Ct. at 1633 (stressing legislative intent to only allow recovery where
investors allege and prove traditional elements of causation and loss). The Court contrasted
the legislative intent with the Ninth Circuit's approach which allowed "recovery where a
misrepresentation leads to an inflated purchase price but nonetheless does not proximately
cause any economic loss." Id.
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Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("Dura") develops and markets pharmaceutical products for the treatment of allergies, asthma, and other respiratory conditions. 8 During the late 1990s, Dura was in the process of developing Spiros, a drug delivery system for asthma patients. 9 As Dura was
conducting clinical trials of Spiros, the plaintiffs purchased stock in the
company. 'o The plaintiffs purchased their shares between April 15, 1997
and February 24, 1998, during which time Dura's stock price climbed from
$28.00 to $39.00 per share." Over this period, Dura issued several press
releases (the "1997 Press Releases") about Spiros and one of its other
products, Ceclor. l2 In these announcements, Dura claimed that it would
complete satisfactory testing of Spiros and soon receive Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") approval, and would see increasing sales of its
respiratory drug Ceclor.13 However, on the last day of the class period,
February 24, 1998, Dura announced that its earnings would be lower than14
expected, primarily because of slow drug sales, particularly of Ceclor.
On February 25, Dura's stock price plunged from $39.00 to $20.00, a 47%
one-day loss.' 5 Dura's business continued to decline throughout 1998 and
in November, the company announced that Spiros would not receive FDA

8 See In re Dura Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 39, 2000 WL 33176043, at *1 (S.D.
Cal. July 11, 2000) (discussing Dura's business strategy), rev'd sub. non. Broudo v. Dura
Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 125 S. Ct. 1627 (2005). Dura focused its
business on purchasing the marketing rights to drugs that large pharmaceutical companies
could no longer sell profitably. Id. at *1. Dura also began developing certain pharmaceutical products, including a drug delivery system to provide a uniform dose of asthma medication to patients. Id. It expected this drug delivery system, Spiros, to promote growth in the
company's business. Id.
9 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (explaining Spiros drug delivery system).
1o See In re Dura, 2000 WL 33176043, at *1 (noting that plaintiffs purchased shares
of Dura between 1997 and 1998); infra note 11 and accompanying text (detailing the
movements of Dura's stock price during that time).
11 In re Dura, 2000 WL 33176043, at *1, *4 (chronicling movements of Dura's stock
price). Dura's stock was at a record high of $47718 on December 31, 1996, but by April 14,
1997 (the day prior to the class period), it had fallen to $27718 amid concerns over Dura's
ability to introduce Spiros by late 1998 or early 1999. Id. at *1. However, by February 24,
1998 (the last day of the class period), it had climbed back to $391"8. Id. at *4.
12 See Broudo, 339 F.3d at 935 (summarizing key statements made by Dura and its
executives during class period).
13 See id. (discussing Dura's press releases). In various press releases, Dura made
statements to the effect that Spiros was on track for FDA approval and that its respiratory
antibiotic Ceclor CD was experiencing strong sales and had increased its market share
significantly. Id. at 935-36. Such press releases were issued on April 15, 1997; June 5,
1997; July 15, 1997; October 14, 1997; November 10, 1997; and January 20, 1998. Id.
14 See 125 S. Ct. at 1630 (outlining timeline of class period).
15 See Broudo, 339 F.3d at 936 (noting that Dura's stock decreased from $391/8 on
February 24, 1998 to $20314 on February 25, 1998).
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approval.16 With this announcement, Dura's 7stock price further declined,
but eventually recovered the following week.'
In their complaint, the plaintiffs claimed that Dura and its executives knew that the content of its 1997 Press Releases was false., 8 In particular, the plaintiffs alleged that Dura issued the 1997 Press Releases to
persuade investors that its drug sales were increasing and that it was successfully completing the development and testing of Spiros; when in fact,
the company knew both to be untrue.' 9 According to the plaintiffs, the
issuance of the 1997 Press Releases was a scheme by Dura's executives to
bolster the company's stock price. 20 The plaintiffs filed several class actions claiming that Dura violated Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5, promulgated thereunder by the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC"). 2' The District Court for the Southern
District of California dismissed the complaint finding that the plaintiffs had
not properly alleged the loss causation element of a Section 10(b) and Rule
10(b)-5 action. 2 The district court focused on the last day of the class pe16

See id. (explaining that FDA did not approve Spiros because of reliability, chemis-

try, manufacturing, and control issues).
17 See 125 S.Ct. at 1630 (referencing plaintiff's
complaint).
18 See Broudo, 339 F.3d at 936 (revealing that Dura knew as early as December 1997
that sales of several products, including Ceclor were actually declining). Dura executives
revealed this information to stock analysts in an April 1998 meeting following the decline
in its business. Id.
19 See In re Dura Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 39, 2000 WL 33176043, at *2 (S.D.
Cal. July 11, 2000) (describing plaintiff's allegation that Dura began a concerted campaign
in April 1997 to deceive investors to drive its stock price higher).
20 See id. at *2 (claiming Dura's executives needed to drive up company's stock price
to accomplish a significant debt offering to raise capital for Spiros' development). The
plaintiffs contended that Dura learned of Spiros' reliability problems (which eventually
became the basis of the FDA's rejection) during its Stage III clinical trials between December 1996 and March 1997. Id. at *1; see also supra note 19 and accompanying text (explaining the plaintiffs' "concerted campaign" theory).
21 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(a)-(b), 78u-4(b) (2005) (providing private cause of action for
securities fraud). Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act provides a private cause
of action in instances where a defendant "use[d] or employ[ed].. .any... manipulative or
deceptive device,"... "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" and "in
contravention of' Securities and Exchange Commission "rules or regulations." 15 U.S.C. §
78j(a), (b). The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") adopted Rule lOb-5, which
prohibits the making of any "untrue statement of material fact" or the omission of any "material fact necessary in order to make the statements made... not misleading." 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (2005); see also Broudo, 339 F.3d at 936 (noting that several class actions were
consolidated to form present action).
22 Broudo, 339 F.3d at 937 (citing In re Dura, 2000 WL 33176043, at *12). The
district court instructed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to "set forth each allegedly
false or misleading statement or omission." Id. at 936. The plaintiffs were told to specify
which of Dura's executives "made the statements and knew the 'true facts' that should have
been disclosed." Id. Although the plaintiffs amended their complaint, it was subsequently
dismissed by the district court for lack of loss causation. Id. The complaint stated merely
that "'in reliance on the integrity of the market, [the plaintiffs].. .paid artificially inflated
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riod, February 24, 1998, and stressed that the complaint did not establish
that the "FDA's non-approval of [Spiros] had any relationship to the February price drop. 23 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed,
finding that the complaint adequately alleged "loss causation." 24 According to the Ninth Circuit, "plaintiffs establish loss causation if they have
shown that the price on the date of purchase was inflated because of the
misrepresentation. 2 5
Under the federal securities laws, investors may file a private cause
of action where a company has made any untrue statement of material
fact.26 In filing such an action, investors must prove several elements, one
of which is causation.27 The causation element has two parts; it includes
both transaction causation, also known as reliance, and loss causation.2 8
prices for Dura securities' and the plaintiffs suffered 'damage[s]' thereby." 125 S. Ct. at
1630 (quoting Plaintiffs' amended complaint at 139a). The district court also dismissed the
plaintiffs' complaint related to Dura's profitability statements about its Ceclor drug.
Broudo, 339 F.3d at 937. In this regard, it found that the complaint failed to allege an appropriate state of mind (i.e. that Dura's executives acted knowingly). 125 S.Ct. at 1630.
23 Broudo, 339 F.3d at 937 (citing In re Dura, 2000 WL 33176043, at *15) (noting
that complaint did not explain how the alleged misrepresentations concerning Spiros
"touched" upon the reasons for Dura's stock price decline). According to the district court,
the reason for the decline in Dura's stock price was because of low revenues. Id.
24 125 S.Ct. at 1630.
25 Broudo, 339 F.3d at 938 (quoting Knapp v. Ernst & Whinney, 90 F.3d 1431, 1438
(9 1hCir. 1996) (emphasis in original) (allowing plaintiffs to sustain section 10(b) and Rule
10(b)-5 action if they identify the cause of the inflated price).
26 See supra note 21 and accompanying text (citing statutory text of section 10(b) and
Rule 10(b)-5).
27 See T. Hazen, Law of Securities Regulation, § 12.11 [1], [3] (5th ed. 2002) (discussing loss causation element of action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5). In addition to
loss causation, investors must prove that (1)the company made a material misrepresentation; (2) the company made the misrepresentation knowingly or with "scienter"; (3) the
company made the misrepresentation in connection with the purchase or sale of a security;
(4) the investors relied on the misrepresentation and (5) as a result of the transaction, the
investors suffered an economic loss. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4); see, e.g., Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32, 248-49 (1988) (developing fraud-on-the-market theory of
reliance); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976) (establishing scienter
requirement); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-31 (1975) (limiting recovery to actual purchasers or sellers).
28 See Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing McGonigle v.
Combs, 968 F.2d 810, 820 (9th Cir. 1992)). In a traditional reliance case, investors must
show that they would not have purchased or sold the securities had they known of the adverse material fact. See Merritt B. Fox, Demystifying Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market
Actions, 60 Bus. LAW. 507, 514 (2005). Essentially, investors must show that "but for" the
company's misstatement they would not have purchased or sold the securities in question.
Id. at 507, 514. However, in Basic, the Supreme Court upheld an alternative way of establishing reliance; the Court approved the "fraud-on-the-market" theory as the basis of a
rebuttable presumption of reliance. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 249. According to the Court,
"an investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by the market does so in reliance on the
integrity of that price. Because most publicly available information is reflected in market
price, an investor's reliance on any public material misrepresentations, therefore, may be
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Loss causation requires investors to establish a connection
between the
29
company's misrepresentation and their economic loss.
Over time, courts developed various theories for establishing loss
causation in fraud-on-the-market cases.3 ° Some courts focused the on the
date of realization-when the market learned of the company's fraud-and
required a showing that the price dropped on that date because of the misrepresentation. 31 Other courts focused on the date of purchase- when
investors purchased their shares-and required a showing that the price
was inflated on that date because of the misrepresentation.32 The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit followed the on-the-date-of-realization or
"causal connection" theory in Emergent Capital.33 In that case, the Second
Circuit rejected the on-the-date-of-purchase theory as being nothing more
than paraphrased transaction causation. 34 According to the court, the onthe-date-of-purchase theory explained why investors purchased their
shares, but not why they lost money on the transaction. The court held
that investors must answer the latter question-why they lost money on the
transaction-to be successful in proving loss causation. 36 Thus, the court
required investors to show that the ultimate decline in the security's price

presumed for purposes of a Rule 10B-5 action." Id. at 247. Thus, in fraud-on-the-market
cases, investors must show that the company's misstatement caused them to pay a higher
price, not that it caused them to purchase the security in the first instance. See Fox, supra
note 28, at 507.
29 See supra notes 27 and 28 and accompanying text (discussing loss causation
and
reliance elements of securities fraud actions).
30 See, e.g., Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc.,
343 F.3d
189, 198 (2nd Cir. 2003) (requiring causal connection); Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223
F.3d 165, 185 (3rd Cir. 2000) (requiring causal connection); Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp.,
892 F.2d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 1990) (requiring causal connection); Gebhardt v. ConAgra
Foods, Inc., 335 F.3d 824, 831 (8th Cir. 2003) (following price inflation theory); Knapp v.
Ernst & Whinney, 90 F.3d 1431, 1438 (9th Cir. 1996) (following price inflation theory);
Robbins v. Koger Prop., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447-48 (1 lth Cir. 1997) (requiring causal
connection); see also Binder, 184 F.3d at 1066.
31 See Fox, supra note 28, at 517 (discussing cases requiring traditional
showing of
loss causation); see, e.g., Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 185; Robbins, 116 F.3d at 1448.
32 See Fox, supra note 28, at 517 (noting cases that follow price inflation theory of
loss causation); see, e.g., Gebhardt,335 F.3d at 831; Knapp, 90 F.3d at 1438.
33 See Emergent Capital,343 F.3d at 198 (holding that price being inflated on date of
purchase was not sufficient); see also supra notes 30 and 31 and accompanying text (citing
cases that required causal connection).
See Emergent Capital, 343 F.3d at 198 (explaining on-the-date-of-purchase theory).

35 See infra note 39 and accompanying text (supporting theory that investors' injury
occurs when they purchase the security).
36 See supra note 34 and accompanying text (calling on-the-date-of-purchase theory
paraphrased transaction causation).
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was reasonably related to the company's correction of its misstatement or
omission.

In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed the
latter on-the-date-of-purchase or "price inflation" theory, and allowed investors to establish loss causation by showing merely that the company's
misrepresentation "touched upon" the reasons for the security's decline in
price. 38 As such, for fraud-on-the-market cases, the Ninth Circuit only
required investors to prove that the price on the date of the purchase was
inflated because of the misrepresentation. 39 The court did not require investors to show that the price declined because of the company's subsequent correction of its misrepresentation or omission.4 ° It did not require
any causal connection between the company's misrepresentation and the
41

security's decline in price.
In Dura Pharmaceuticalsv. Broudo, the Supreme Court considered
whether investors could establish loss causation by pleading that the price
on the date of purchase was inflated because of the misrepresentation.4 2 In
other words, the Court considered whether the latter price inflation theory

of loss causation was permissible.43 The Court correctly rejected such a
theory, holding that something more was required. 44 With limited discussion, the court explained that investors have the burden of showing that the
company's misrepresentation caused them some economic harm.4 5 The
Court stressed that the Ninth Circuit's theory was unacceptable because it
allowed recovery where the misrepresentation caused price inflation, but
nonetheless caused no economic harm.46

37 See Emergent Capital, 343 F.3d at 198 (stressing need to show causal connection).
"[Slecurities fraud plaintiffs [must] demonstrate a causal connection between the content of
the alleged misstatements or omissions and the 'harm actually suffered."' Id.
38 See Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting McGonigle
v. Combs, 968 F.2d 810, 821 (9th Cir. 1992)).
39 See Knapp v. Ernst & Whinney, 90 F.3d 1431, 1438 (9th Cir. 1996) (following
theory that plaintiffs injury occurs on date of purchase).
40 See supra notes 25, 38, and 39 and accompanying text (emphasis added) (discussing Ninth Circuit's on-the-date-of-purchase approach to determining loss causation).
41 See supra notes 38 and 39 and accompanying text (outlining how investors prove
loss causation using price inflation theory).
42 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (summarizing Ninth Circuit's presumption
of loss causation).
43 See supra notes 30, 32, 38 and 39 and accompanying text (citing cases following
price inflation theory).
44 See supra notes 6 and 7 and accompanying text (requiring plaintiffs to show reason
why price was inflated).
45 See supra note 6 and accompanying text (requiring specific allegation of economic
loss).
46 See supra note 7 and accompanying text (stressing need to show why security
declined in price).
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The Court was correct in rejecting the Ninth Circuit's price inflation
theory for two reasons.47 First, the price inflation theory renders the loss
causation element of securities fraud actions redundant to that of transaction causation. 4 Second, the theory disregards the purposes for which the
loss causation element was developed.49
Transaction causation and loss causation are distinct elements of securities fraud actions, and they are relevant at different points along the
investors' timeline.50 Transaction causation focuses on the market when
the investor purchased the security-before the company's misstatement is
disclosed 1 In contrast, loss causation should focus on the market at a later
point-after the company's misstatement is corrected.52 The price inflation
theory ignores this difference; it focuses on when the investor purchased
the security for both transaction causation and loss causation, which the
Court correctly found to be its fatal problem.53
To establish transaction causation/reliance, investors may use the
fraud-on-the-market presumption. 54 The fraud-on-the-market presumption
assumes that the company's misstatement is reflected in the security's
price and as such, that the investors paid a higher price for it.55 The price
inflation theory allows investors to use this same presumption in establishing loss causation; it allows investors to show merely that they paid a
higher price for the security because of the misrepresentation and nothing
more. 56 This renders the loss causation element redundant to that of transaction causation.5 7 "If all [investors] ha[ve] to show.. .is that the misstatement inflated the price at the time of purchase, [they] do not need to show,
as the traditional loss causation formulation requires, that [they] held [the

47

See infra notes 48, 62, and 63 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for re-

jecting price inflation theory).
48

See Fox, supra note 28, at 517 (clarifying that loss causation and transaction causa-

tion are two distinct elements of securities fraud actions).
49 See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (describing purpose of loss causation
element).
50 See supra note 27 and accompanying text (outlining various elements of securities
fraud actions).
51 See supra note 28 and accompanying text (explaining transaction causation).
52 See supra note 37 and accompanying text (requiring causal connection between
company's misstatement and investor's loss).
53 See supra note 39 and accompanying text (supporting theory that investor's injury
occurs on date of purchase).
54 See supra note 28 and accompanying text (noting development of fraud-on-themarket theory).
55 See supra note 28 and accompanying text (clarifying transaction causation element).
56 See supra note 48 and accompanying text (arguing that price inflation theory renders loss causation element meaningless).
57 See supra note 48 and accompanying text (explaining that price inflation theory
utilizes the same presumption for both transaction and loss causation).
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security] until the point that the market realized the true situation. 58 Under the price inflation theory, the investors' injury occurs well before the
market corrects itself; it occurs at the time of the transaction. 59 Thus, investors do not necessarily suffer a loss after the transaction, which is exactly what the loss causation element requires.6 °
The loss causation element of securities fraud actions was established to assure that a company's misrepresentation was in some way reasonably or proximately responsible for the investors' economic loss. 6 I
Courts created the loss causation element as a means of restricting liability,
of requiring "something more" than just transaction causation.62 As stated
by Merritt Fox in the article Demystifying Causation in Fraud-on-theMarket Actions,
If, to impose liability on a defendant, all that an investor has
to show is that she was induced into purchasing shares by the
defendant's misstatement--i.e., transaction causation--the defendant would be insuring the plaintiff against every risk that
could possibly depress price below the price paid at time of
purchase, including risks totally unrelated to the misstatement. Loss causation is the requirement of "something
more," akin to proximate cause
in negligence, that prevents
63
liability.
ranging
wide
such
The price inflation theory eliminates that "something more"; it allows investors to satisfy both transaction causation and loss causation by simply
introducing evidence that the price was inflated. 64 However, the purpose
of the loss causation element is not to prove that the misrepresentation
caused the inflation of the security's price, but rather to prove that it caused
a subsequent decline in its price. 65 Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5 are not
intended to act as insurance for private investors; they are intended to pro58 Fox, supra note 28, at 517-18 (arguing that loss causation element requires more

than mere inflation in price).
59 See id. (noting which dates are relevant to transaction causation and loss causation).
60 See supra notes 27 and 28 and accompanying text (outlining securities fraud action
and its various elements).
61 See Fox, supra note 28, at 511 (discussing case law that developed dual-framework
of transaction and loss causation).
62 See id. at 515 (clarifying that action for securities fraud not intended as insurance
against economic loss).
63 See id. (noting that loss causation is poor fit in fraud-on-the-market cases).
64 See id. (stressing that price inflation theory renders transaction and loss causation
redundant).
65 See supra note 7 and accompanying text (emphasis added) (explaining legislative
intent to only allow recovery where investors prove traditional elements of causation and

loss).
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vide recovery where a company's fraudulent
misrepresentation actually
66
caused the investors' some economic loss.
In conclusion, in fraud-on-the-market cases, investors are not required to prove that the misrepresentation induced them to purchase the
security. If the price inflation theory were adopted, investors would also
not be required to prove that the misrepresentation caused them any economic harm. Such a result is contrary to the purposes of the federal securities laws and as recognized by the Supreme Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, is not permissible.

Mackenzie Shea

66 See supra notes 27, 28, 62, and 63 (discussing claim of securities fraud and its

intended purpose).

